1.1 A Bankrupt Nation (Click HERE)
1.2 The Historic Theft of the Sovereign Power of Money Issuance by the Money Power (Click HERE)
1.3 American Constitutional Confusion (Click HERE)
1.4 Monetary Wars Begin in the U.S.: 1795-1832 (Click HERE)
1.5 President Andrew Jackson Defeats the Money Power; How the “Bank War” Anticipated Today’s Monetary Reform Movement: Monetary Reform for the 2028 Election
The articles in this series leading up to the 2028 election are not intended to be a complete American history. Many readers will want to have additional background. For this I recommend my own book Our Country, Then and Now, published by Clarity Press in January 2024. The best resource I know of for the era from 1800 through the 1830s is Arthur Schlesinger Jr.’s “The Age of Jackson.” With all due respect, I think it fair to say that most works on American history are written by and for the Money Power or, at best, exclude or distort key information. The two works cited above are not Money Power apologies. Schlesinger was JFK’s personal historian. I view JFK as one of our country’s true “people’s presidents,” which was why the Money Power got rid of him. Now to resume our story. For previous installments, see A Bankrupt Nation, The Historic Theft of the Sovereign Power of Money Issuance, American Constitutional Confusion, and Monetary Wars Begin in the U.S: 1795-1828.
President Andrew Jackson Faces Down the Money Power: As we begin our discussion of President Andrew Jackson’s epochal “Bank War” against the Second Bank of the United States, we cross a threshold into what for most readers is unfamiliar territory.
There was a time in American history when Jackson was viewed as a great president for his championing of the common man—remember the era of the “Jefferson-Jackson Day” dinners?
But as the Money Power extended its tentacles during our post-1913 era of the Federal Reserve, Jackson was increasingly seen as a reactionary, an obstructionist, and, with respect to his opposition to the so-called “American System,” even a “traitor.”
Of course, Jackson is also castigated as a slaveholder and an architect of the removal of the Native Americans from the eastern U.S. Personally, I am willing to view Jackson as a man of his times and leave it at that, even with my own Native American ancestry.
So let’s move to the fact that during the period we are now exploring, Jackson took on the Money Power head-on. What this meant, but is not so well known, was that Jackson also faced down the power of the Bank of England, which was the central institution of the colossus that was becoming the British Empire, now engaged in conquests across Eurasia, including not only India but also Persia, Afghanistan, Burma, Malaysia, and even China.
These wars were financed, of course, through money lent to the British government and its agents by the Bank of England. Individuals embedded within the Bank of England network were closely involved with bankers in the U.S. as well. As we have seen, such wars are vastly profitable to the private owners who have ownership stakes in the banks. These profits come from interest on the loans extended to the government as well as appreciation in the value of bank stocks. Today, Great Britain is still tightly controlled by the Money Power, with King Charles III its figurehead.
Of course, Jackson’s fiscal conservatism, allowing him to pay off 100% of the federal deficit by 1835, was helped by the fact that he and his hand-picked successor Martin Van Buren kept the nation at peace during their tenure, even with the agitation brewing in Texas and the issues deriving from the conflicts over expansion of slavery into the nation’s territories.
Jackson and his supporters created the Democratic Party to promote his campaign for president in 1828. The Democratic Party is supposedly the oldest organized political party in the world but has gone through many permutations. Later, the Democratic Party was heavily influenced by the Southern nationalists who had close commercial alliances with Britain and the banks which handled the growing cotton trade. Later, the Democratic Party split over regional differences in the 1860 election, allowing Abraham Lincoln and the Republicans to take control.
The Second Bank of the United States: What then was the Second Bank of the United States that Jackson was determined, first, to “curb,” then to destroy?
In his monumental history, The Age of Jackson, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., wrote the following:
“In 1836 the charter of the Second Bank of the United States was to expire. This institution was not in the later sense a national bank. It was a banking corporation, located in Philadelphia, privately controlled, but possessing unique and profitable relations with the government.”
Thus the Bank fulfilled the dictum of Alexander Hamilton that the financial institutions of the U.S. should create tangible benefits for the Money Power in order to assure its support and collaboration in affairs of state.
Schlesinger continued:
“To its capital of $35 million, the government had subscribed one-fifth. [Another fifth was subscribed by foreign investors.] It served as repository of the public funds, which it could use for its own banking purposes without payment of interest. It could issue bank notes [i.e., through lending] up to the physical ability of the [Bank] president and cashier to sign them; after 1827 it evaded this limitation by the invention of ‘branch drafts,’ which looked and circulated like notes but which were actually bills of exchange [i.e., paper IOUs]. The Bank was not to be taxed by the states and no similar institution was to be chartered by Congress. In return for these privileges, the Bank paid a bonus of one and a half million dollars, transferred public funds and made public payments without charge, and allowed the government to appoint five out of twenty-five directors. The Secretary of the Treasury could remove the government deposits provided he laid the reasons before Congress.” (p.74)
Of course, if the Treasury secretary pulled the government’s deposits out of the Bank, he would deprive the Bank of its ability to lend money on the “fractional reserve” basis. This would effectively destroy the Bank, which became President Andrew Jackson’s weapon of choice in doing so.
In carrying out its lending policies through its eighteen branches, the Bank, behind its strong-willed President Nicholas Biddle, claimed complete independence in its operational decisions from President Jackson or any other official of the U.S. government. It was thus the most powerful institution in the land with the most latitude to direct the progress of the country.
Schlesinger went on:
“In Biddle’s eyes the Bank was thus an independent corporation, on a level with the state, and not responsible to it except as the narrowest interpretation of the charter compelled. Biddle tried to strengthen this positioning by flourishing a theory that the Bank was beyond political good or evil, but Alexander Hamilton had written with far more candor [in his Report on a National Bank] that ‘such a bank is not a mere matter of private property, but a political machine of the greatest importance to the State.’
The Second Bank of the United States was, in fact, as Hamilton had intended such a bank should be, the keystone in the alliance between the government and the business community.” (p.76)
And this wasn’t all. The Bank was also a component of a growing international financial system presided over by the Bank of England, what I call the Money Power. So the U.S. president was not to come anywhere near Bank business in the U.S. itself but was also obligated to stay far away from finances pertaining to Great Britain—the nation’s most powerful commercial partner and rival.
How this played out might be discerned later during the Panic of 1837, which took place almost the instant the charter of the Second Bank expired. It was then the Money Power which plunged the U.S. into depression, though Jackson was blamed, then and now.
After his Bank’s demise, Biddle, now age 52, was able to convert the institution into the United States Bank of Philadelphia, which invested heavily in cotton speculation, southern slave plantation mortgages, and projects for Indian removal from southern lands. So Biddle was able to live on as a rejected plutocrat, while the nation spiraled into the morass of what became the Civil War.
How Jackson Viewed Money: What was Jackson’s basic attitude toward money and the Constitution?
Of course, Jackson inherited the Bank from previous administrations going back to when it was founded in 1816 after Madison had made peace with Britain to end the War of 1812. But Jackson had never in his life believed that federal government financial operations should be conducted on the basis of anything other than specie—gold and silver—and definitely not paper in any format.
Part of the difficulty, of course, was that the U.S. had no large gold or silver mines so was dependent on acquiring specie from foreign sources—either from import duties—tariffs—or on coinage brought by private parties to the U.S. Mint in Philadelphia for conversion into U.S. money. This meant in practice that without the Second Bank, any paper money had to be conjured from state-chartered banks, which had existed in the U.S. since 1781 and which Jackson was willing to tolerate. These banks were expected to have a specie reserve to support their fractional reserve lending, though the amount varied and sometimes scarcely existed at all. State-chartered banks also had foreign owners and investors.
Oddly enough, it appears that Jackson did his personal banking at the Nashville branch of the Second Bank of the United States, though he kept most of his wealth in land and livestock. His Hermitage plantation was a profitable working farm using slave labor.
For many of Jackson’s supporters, however, especially in the West, where farmers were always, then and now, in debt to the local bank, there was no opposition to paper money per se. The issue, rather, lay in suspicions that the Second Bank actually restrained further issue of paper money that would allow the farmers to pay their debts and buy more land. These people often saw the Bank as the property of greedy easterners out to swindle them.
Before proceeding, we need to discuss three interrelated phenomena: 1) How the state-chartered banks functioned; 2) Westward expansion; 3) Poverty in the midst of plenty.
State-chartered banks: Throughout this series of articles, we have discussed the role of state and local banks—all chartered under state laws—in the U.S. financial system, starting with the Bank of North America being established in Philadelphia in 1781. Up to the time of the Civil War, state-chartered banks issued the vast majority of paper currency in circulation, acting as the primary source of money for everyday transactions.
During this period, state laws allowed virtually anyone to establish a bank and issue notes with minimal oversight, leading to a fragmented system of different types of banknotes. Each state set its own reserve ratios, capital requirements, and banking regulations. Banknotes from one state were often accepted only at a discount in another, creating a complex and inefficient national currency system.
By the time of the Civil War, there were about 2,000 such banks, all chartered under state banking laws. Called “free banks,” they were not regulated by the federal government, though under the First and Second Banks of the United States, they could be influenced by having their bonds purchased by the U.S. Bank then redeemed for specie—gold and silver. It’s been estimated that the entire system of state banks accounted for 8,000 different types of currency note, which gave birth to a whole sub-industry of brokers trading in them.
Brave AI states: “All free banks in the antebellum era were fractional-reserve institutions: they held specie (gold/silver) that was only a fraction of their outstanding notes. State free banking laws typically required reserves of 10–20% of notes in specie, with the rest backed by state bonds filed with the state auditor. Banks could issue notes up to the face value of those bonds.
“The critical loophole: bonds were often purchased at a discount but accepted at par as security. A banker could buy $10,000 in bonds for $7,000, file them, and issue $10,000 in notes — or even two or three times the bond value in some cases. The bank then collected interest on the bonds while circulating the notes.
“The whole scheme depended on minimizing actual redemptions. By locating in remote frontier towns, banks made it expensive and inconvenient for noteholders to travel and demand specie. Fewer redemptions meant the bank could hold even less specie than the legal minimum and still survive. As the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis put it: ‘banks with fewer notes redeemed could hold less specie and generate higher net revenue for their owners.’”
There was a major difference between the older, more established banks in the growing financial centers of eastern cities like Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and Charleston—with other cities like Hartford, Baltimore, Richmond, etc., now emerging—and the more freewheeling banks to the West, often called “Wildcat Banks.” The eastern banks were much better organized, more stable, had stronger ties to British banks organized around the Bank of England, and were closely integrated with the Second Bank of the United States during the latter’s existence from 1816-1836. The Wildcat Banks were less stable, more subject to runs and bankruptcies, and more closely tied to emerging farming and manufacturing centers in the West.
Unlike Treasury notes being spent into circulation by the government, as was done during the War of 1812, banknotes were lent into circulation, so had to be repaid to the banks with interest. This meant that the quantity of money available for spending was constantly expanding and contracting, with no one monitoring the net effects on the economy as a whole. In fact, with money draining out of the system via savings, hoarding, reinvestment, or export to foreign stockholders, the tendency was always toward a cash shortage, creating pressure for more borrowing to pay negative balances or inflation in order to repay loans with depreciated currency. The number and frequency of “panics” during the early 19th testified to the inherent instability of the system.
Westward Expansion: By 1810, the U.S. comprised roughly 1.7 million square miles of territory, the vast majority of which was public domain—i.e., federal—land. Between 1780 and 1802, seven of the original thirteen states ceded their western land claims to the federal government. By 1802, all territory west of the original colonies— from the Appalachian Mountains to the Mississippi River — was public domain. This included the areas that would become Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin in the Old Northwest, parts of Missouri and West Virginia, and the unorganized territories in the South.
Then there was the Louisiana Purchase—828,000 square miles, or 530 million acres. This covered the entire western half of the Mississippi River basin from the Gulf of Mexico to the Canadian border and from the Mississippi to the Rocky Mountains. This was the single largest land acquisition in US history and nearly doubled the country’s size.
By 1810, 30 million acres beyond the Alleghenies were already held by private individuals (sold or claimed). Private land claims from French and Spanish colonial-era grants existed throughout the Louisiana Purchase (e.g., in New Orleans, St. Louis, and Natchez). Native American lands occupied much of the interior, though the federal government held title in trust. And bounty land warrants had already been issued to ex-soldiers for Revolutionary War service, though many parcels were still unlocatable.
In September 1810, the Republic of West Florida declared independence from Spain, and in December 1810, the U.S. military took possession of the portion west of the Pearl River, claiming it was part of the Louisiana Purchase. Spain disputed this until the Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819, through which the U.S. acquired all of Florida.
Sale of this land to the public proceeded under the Public Land Survey System, usually at auction, and, behind tariffs, became a principal source of federal government revenue all the way up to the Homestead Act of 1862, when land began to be disbursed to settlers for free. Much of the federal land was purchased by speculators, including purchases by state-chartered banks. By 1840, about 40% of the U.S. population—about seven million people—lived on land west of the Appalachians that had once been part of the public domain.
Of course, a huge amount of the banking business of the West and South involved the buying and selling of land acquired from the public domain. Vast fortunes were gained and lost, with early land purchases still accounting for a substantial portion of present-day deeded property, especially in agricultural areas. It was also purchase of public land that made the gigantic cotton industry of the South possible, along with the associated growth of slavery, slave “breeding,” and the slave trade. Federal revenues from land sales also kept excise taxes low and a federal income tax non-existent until the Civil War.
Disgusted by the often-worthless paper the speculators offered to purchase government-owned land, the Jackson administration issued the “Specie Circular” in 1836, requiring payment for public land in gold or silver, which helped trigger the Panic of 1837. As the Specie Circular sucked specie out of the state-chartered banks to pay for land, this reduced its availability as backing for loans for other types of activity.
Poverty in the Midst of Plenty: The growing phenomenon of “poverty in the midst of plenty,” exacerbated by a shortage of circulating currency to support consumption through employment, is a phenomenon familiar to us through the novels of Charles Dickens, with something similar happening in the U.S. As national economies developed, a worrisome phenomenon began to appear among Western nations, which was that the amount of income earned by individuals in the form of wages, salaries, and dividends was never sufficient to pay the prices needed to be charged those same individuals for purchase of the articles offered for sale. Thus there was always a “gap” between production and income due to “leakage” of purchasing power which no one at the time was able to explain, including economists like Henry C. Carey (1793-1879), one of the most outspoken advocates of the American System. Their solution was simply to produce more of everything and let consumption take care of itself.
The phenomenon of the production-income gap had been noted in Europe over a century ago and was enunciated in the U.S. in an 1830 address by S. C. Allen:
“There may be wool enough in the hands of the grower, and unemployed laborers ready to do the work, and yet the cloth for this man’s coat cannot be made….There exist the power and material of production and the want of the product, and yet the work of production cannot go forward.” (Age of Jackson, p.153)
Author and journalist Orestes A. Brownson wrote in 1843:
“More can be produced, in any given year with the present productive power, than can be sold in any given five years…We create a surplus—that is a surplus—not when we consider the wants of the people, but when we consider the state of the markets—and then must slacken our hand till the surplus is worked off. During this time, while we are working off the surplus, while the mills run short time, or stop altogether, the workmen must want employment. The evil is inherent in the system.” (Age of Jackson, p.122)
The practical result of “the evil…in the system” was pressure and agitation for more money, more bank lending, lower interest rates, faster spending (i.e., “velocity”), or, among nations, cutthroat competition such as the kind which drove British statesmen to agitate for “free trade” so they could sell their production much easier abroad, or high tariffs by nations like the U.S. needing to protect their ability to produce from British “dumping.”
Naturally, any measures taken by the U.S. government to tighten credit or revert to “hard money” had the potential for causing grave economic hardship, with the banks desiring to remove all restraints on their own highly profitable ability to lend more and more paper money so people could buy the necessities of life. Obviously, these dilemmas have not been solved to this day. Of course, if the government had the ability to spend money into existence for its own requirements, some of the pressure might be relieved. But the Money Power was opposed to this, and they had the cash to buy off politicians who would have had to authorize such measures.
The Bank War: As Jackson’s first term proceeded, starting with his election in 1828, he reviewed his options for dealing with the abuses emanating from the Second Bank of the United States, including a detailed review of proposals for a national bank of a different format.
Perhaps the best available resource in studying the actual events of the time, vs. the anti-Jackson propaganda that has been spewed forth ever since by Money Power apologists, is the 184-page volume by Prof. Robert Remini, author of Andrew Jackson and the Bank War (Norton, 1967).
Remini wrote: “By 1828 the Bank was a financial colossus, entrenched in the nation’s economy, possessing the means of draining specie from state banks at will and regulating the currency according to its own estimates of the nation’s needs.” (p.39)
This translates into one word: power, with unrestrained wealth following.
The Bank was “a vast electioneering engine.” (p.44) Thus the Bank worked strenuously to defeat Democratic Party candidates aligned with Jackson in the 1828 congressional elections that also brought Jackson to the presidency. During the campaign, the Bank became notorious for making cash payments to newspapers and journals spouting the pro-Bank line as well as numerous personal loans to sitting members of Congress. Bank President Biddle also “refused to take seriously charges of political favoritism by his branch banks.” (p.54) He made clear in his public statements that the way he conducted Bank business was entirely his own affair and not the concern of any elected politician, including the president of the United States.
The claim was, of course, the same made by today’s Federal Reserve, a system which is, by law, the actual property of its member private sector banks, not the federal government. The claim is that by refusing to listen to any “outside” opinions, the banking system is “above politics.” “Politics,” which, following the Constitution, is the process by which the people elect their representatives, thus becomes a dirty word, at least as the Money Power sees it.
In the case both of the Second Bank of the United States and the Federal Reserve, the way they run a financial system based on debt and borrowing, including management of federal funds on deposit, printing money “out of thin air,” and the indebtedness of the government to “investors,” was something to be left to the secretive machinations of the Money Power behind closed doors.
Also like the Federal Reserve, the primary support for the Second Bank came from the upper economic classes. A key to this support was the fact that it was the upper economic classes—including Europeans—who owned bank stock which was viewed as their personal property by the courts and was always expected to appreciate in value and yield dividends, regardless of the condition of the national economy. Indeed, it was the fiduciary duty of the government to allow maximum Bank profits. Once again, it’s the same system that prevails with today’s Federal Reserve.
So President Andrew Jackson was within his rights when he “seriously contended that the Bank was dangerous to the liberty of the American people because it concentrated enormous power in private hands and used this power to control legislation, influence elections, and even manipulate the operations of the government to get what it wanted.” (Andrew Jackson and the Bank War, p.44)
Once again, we could be reading a description of the conditions prevailing over the last 113 years under the Federal Reserve System. Jackson also believed “that the economic problem, the balance of class power, overshadowed all other questions of the day.” (Age of Jackson, p.59) He thus foresaw with stunning clarity the central issue emerging from the Money Power’s overreach.
Biddle then made the decision to use his power with the members of Congress he had in thrall—or on his payroll—to fight Jackson’s criticisms by getting his friends and supporters to enter a motion to recharter the bank prior to the elections of 1832, even though the existing charter would not run out until four years later—in 1836!
It was a blatant declaration that he—Nicholas Biddle—was the real ruler of the American state, a move of staggering arrogance, and above all a direct attack on Jackson, the presidency, and the Constitution. Remini called Biddle’s actions “lunacy.” (Andrew Jackson and the Bank War, p.70)
On June 11, 1832, a bill to renew the Bank’s charter passed the Senate, 28-20. On July 3 it passed the House 107-85. President Andrew Jackson then vetoed the bill. “The message, dated July 10, burst like a thunderclap over the nation.” (Age of Jackson, p.90)
Jackson’s words in his veto message still ring true today:
“It is to be regretted that the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of governments to their selfish purposes. Distinctions in society will always exist under every just government. Equality of talents, of education, or of wealth cannot be produced by human institutions. In the full enjoyment of the gifts of Heaven and the fruits of superior industry, economy, and virtue, every man is equally entitled to protection by law; but when the laws undertake to add to these natural and just advantages artificial distinctions…to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful, the humble members of society—the farmers, mechanics, and laborers—who have neither the time nor the means of securing like favors to themselves, have a right to complain of the injustice of their Government.” (Age of Jackson, p.90)
Bank President Biddle said of Jackson’s veto message: “It has all the fury of a chained panther biting the bars of his cage.” (Age of Jackson, p.91)
But the veto stuck, though most of the press, influenced by their profits from running pro-Bank advertisements, opposed it. Here the free American press revealed its true colors: its opinions are almost always for sale.
Exhibiting his own fury, Biddle sharply restricted credit and called in loans, causing an immediate economic downturn. The purpose of Biddle’s action was to blackmail Congress into overriding Jackson’s veto of the recharter legislation and to influence the public to defeat Jackson’s quest for reelection in November 1832.
Biddle knew exactly what he was doing. He wrote in a personal letter: “My own course is decided—all the other Banks and all the merchants may break, but the Bank of the United States shall not break.” (Age of Jackson, p.103)
Biddle’s terror campaign failed, even though a majority of the press and even the voting public, at least in the Eastern states, still supported the Bank. In November 1832, while the Bank was spending thousands of dollars against him, Andrew Jackson was reelected. What may have saved his presidency was his firmness in facing down South Carolina’s attempt under John C. Calhoun to nullify federal tariff legislation and Jackson’s declaration that he would resort to military force to preserve the Union.
Then almost a year later, on September 10, 1833, Jackson announced he was withdrawing all federal funds from the Bank and depositing them in selected state-chartered banks in New York, Boston, Baltimore, and Philadelphia. Critics called these his “Pet Banks,” though they were some of the most prestigious financial institutions in the country.
Gone now were the Second Bank’s lending reserves. The Bank was dead, and it was Jackson who killed it.
One observer commented: “Who but Gen Jackson would have had the courage to veto the bill rechartering the Bank of the United States, and who but Gen Jackson could have withstood the overwhelming influence of that corrupt Aristocracy?” (Andrew Jackson and the Bank War, p.107)
A close advisor of Jackson, Amos Kendall, said that Jackson acted with “almost religious fervor.” Kendall spoke the mind of many Americans when he said of the whole episode, “Providence has had a hand.” (Andrew Jackson and the Bank War, p.81)
In the midst of the controversy, Kendall, a brilliant political tactician and former Kentucky newspaper editor, engaged in a shouting match with a congressman on the street near the Capitol. He said, “What! Are you prepared to give up the Republic? This is a struggle to maintain a government of the people against the most heartless of all aristocracies, that of money. Yield now, and the Bank of the United States will henceforth be the governing power, whatever may be the form of our institutions.” (Andrew Jackson and the Bank War, p.pp.130-131)
Still, Biddle threw one final tantrum. On October 7, 1833, he implemented a program to curtail loans throughout the nation’s entire banking system. Biddle’s “squeeze” was intended to produce a panic similar to the Panic of 1819 and force Jackson to restore government funds and recharter the Bank. The nation saw a 20% economic downturn, but the state-chartered banks, freed of the Second Bank incubus, were able to pick up the slack. The Second Bank of the United States had shot its wad.
There was no central bank in the U.S. until passage of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. The Money Power’s takeover did then take place, but not for another 80 years, during which three to four generations of Americans yet had time to develop their nation in some semblance of sovereignty and liberty.
Jackson Reviewed Numerous Options for a Central U.S. Bank: President Jackson’s enemies, then and now, portray him as a Neanderthal who opposed all progress and wanted the government to hoard gold and silver in its vaults while the people starved. The truth is that he presided over a booming national economy that was well-served by a robust though chaotic system of state-chartered banks, with state and local governments busily creating modern systems of taxation, public services, and infrastructure development. What threatened to destroy this trajectory was the Civil War.
Furthermore, Jackson was not opposed to central banking per se, but not of the kind embodied in the First and Second Banks of the United States, which were the instruments and pathway to total domination by the Money Power.
For details on the proposals under review by the Jackson administration, Prof. Robert Remini’s Andrew Jackson and the Bank War remains an outstanding resource.
Among the proposals were creation of a Third Bank of the United States, but one that was capitalized by federal government revenues, headquartered in Washington, D.C., with branches in each state. There would be no private sector investors owning stock in the Third Bank. Directors at headquarters would be named by Congress, with state branch directors named by each state’s congressional delegation.
Under Jackson’s concept, the federal government would no longer borrow money from the private sector, even during time of war. Instead, the government would be able to issue currency as it did under the Madison administration during the War of 1812. Another option would be for the government’s bank to make loans using its revenues as a reserve similar to today’s public banking done by institutions like the state bank of North Dakota, the only such institution active in the U.S. today.
The Third Bank would be a depository institution for its commercial operations and, as with the Second Bank, have authority to redeem local currencies issued by the state-chartered banks to prevent inflationary bubbles arising from excessive lending of bank paper.
Thus national banking would be taken out of the hands of the Money Power and placed firmly under the control of the executive and legislative branches of the government as the Constitution intended.
Unfortunately, with the controversies over the Second Bank fresh in the minds of the nation, there was no way that Jackson or his successor Martin Van Buren could have guided the kind of system they had in mind through Congress. The Money Power had lost its Bank but was too powerful for a rational alternative to be enacted in law.
It happened like this: In 1834, a year after Jackson pulled the government’s money out of the Second Bank, his opponents, led by Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, joined to form the Whig Party. In 1840, after the Money Power triggered the Panic of 1837 (more on which later), and completion of the single presidential term of Jackson’s Vice-President Martin Van Buren, the Whigs elected William Henry Harrison, who died after 32 days in office.
Harrison’s successor, John Tyler, vetoed several attempts to recharter the Bank, after which the Whigs formally expelled him from their party. But the furor over the Bank faded away when the Mexican War commenced under Democratic President James K. Polk. Polk also signed legislation for an Independent Treasury, to be discussed in the next installment. The Democrats viewed the Independent Treasury as the only safe location to sequester the nation’s financial resources from the predation of the Money Power.
Similarities Between Jackson’s Proposals and Today’s Monetary Reform Movement: Finally, we should make careful note of the ways in which Jackson’s proposals resembled ideas to be found in today’s monetary reform movement. In particular, we should make note of the ways Jackson anticipated the critical features of the NEED Act (National Emergency Employment and Defense Act) of 2011 entered on the books of Congress by Rep. Dennis Kucinich. The NEED Act was based on the American Monetary Act developed by Stephen Zarlenga, director of the American Monetary Institute.
The NEED Act and its origins will be treated in detail in Part 2 of this series, where we address the solutions to the crisis in American governance resulting from takeover of the nation by the Money Power with the Federal Reserve Act of 1913.
As background we close with a summary of the NEED Act provided by Brave AI:
The National Emergency Employment Defense Act of 2011 (H.R. 2990), introduced by Rep. Dennis Kucinich, is a monetary reform bill that replaces Federal Reserve notes with “United States Money” created exclusively by the federal government. It dismantles the Federal Reserve System, transferring its functions to a new Monetary Authority within the Department of the Treasury.
Key provisions include:
Ends fractional reserve banking: It criminalizes money creation by private banks through lending against deposits, requiring banks to hold deposits as bailment (trust) rather than lending them out. [Banks will borrow directly from the Monetary Authority to secure funds for lending for authorized purposes.]
Direct money creation: The Monetary Authority determines the money supply to prevent inflation or deflation, while the Treasury originates new money to fund government deficits, infrastructure, and education without borrowing.
Retires national debt: It mandates that the Treasury pay off all outstanding U.S. debt in “United States Money” as it becomes due, effectively retiring the national debt without deficit borrowing.
Citizens’ Dividend: It directs the Treasury to recommend a tax-free Citizens’ Dividend to all U.S. citizens to provide liquidity to the banking system and stimulate the economy.
Interest rate cap: It sets a ceiling on interest rates at 8% per annum and limits interest payments to the amount of the principal.
State and Local Support: It allocates 25% of new money to states on a per capita basis for infrastructure and education, and provides interest-free loans to local governments for public projects.
Thanks for reading. In the next installment, we pick up the story with Martin Van Buren’s presidency and how the Money Power instigated the Panic of 1837. Then on to the Civil War and the famous Greenbacks.
Research for this article has been facilitated by Brave AI.
Richard C. Cook is a retired U.S. federal analyst with extensive experience across various government agencies, including the U.S. Civil Service Commission, FDA, the Carter White House, NASA, and the U.S. Treasury. He is a graduate of the College of William and Mary. As a whistleblower at the time of the Challenger disaster, he exposed the flawed O-ring joints that destroyed the Space Shuttle, documenting his story in the book “Challenger Revealed.” After serving at Treasury, he became a vocal critic of the private finance-controlled monetary system, detailing his concerns in “We Hold These Truths: The Hope of Monetary Reform.” He served as an adviser to the American Monetary Institute and worked with Congressman Dennis Kucinich to advocate for replacing the Federal Reserve with a genuine national currency. See his new book, Our Country, Then and Now, Clarity Press, 2023. Also see his Three Sages Substack. He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).
“Every human enterprise must serve life, must seek to enrich existence on earth, lest man become enslaved where he seeks to establish his dominion!” Bô Yin Râ (Joseph Anton Schneiderfranken, 1876-1943), translation by Posthumus Projects Amsterdam, 2014. Also download the Kober Press edition of The Book on the Living God here.


Same as it always was....
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What I've read is that different factions took to themselves the right to create money.
All money is created out of thin air.
There is nothing special about gold that makes it a better form of money.
Gold can be translated to any form of money and thus appears to be a safer investment. But in the end, if you're on a desert island and have all the gold, while the "other guy" has all the coconuts, if he doesn't want your money you are screwed.
All money is imaginary. It is a useful construct but no matter, it is not real.
All the different forms of money we read about: bank-notes; specie, bills of exchange, silver certificates, all the cryptocurrencies, whatever -- only work because people subscribe to a mass hallucination that they should work.
When people lose that faith, then you get the collapse of the Weimar Republic. We always hear about the wheelbarrows of cash needed to buy a loaf of bread, but I don't recall any of the "intimate details" of why it crashed. Something about the enormous war reparations the Allies put on Germany, so Germany purposely chose to destroy its own currency to make that debt worthless. Just another game like Bessent's "D-Day".